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DISTANCIATION AND 
TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION 
Barry D. SMITH 
RÉSUME. — Selon Ricœur, Gadamer établit une fausse antinomie entre la vérité et 
la méthode. La distanciation entre le discours écrit et le sens voulu par l'auteur 
produit le monde du texte. C'est ce monde que découvre la méthode structurale. 
Le lecteur est alors confronté au monde du texte, et il se crée une distanciation 
entre la vérité du texte et l'horizon du lecteur. Cette distanciation est dépassée 
par l'interprétation. C'est pourquoi, pour Ricœur, la vérité et la méthode sont deux 
étapes de l'interprétation d'un texte, qui correspondent à deux types reliés de 
distanciation. 
SUMMARY. — Ricœur criticizes Gadamer for setting up a false antinomy between 
truth and method. The distanciation of the written discourse from an author's 
intended sense results in the production of the world of a text. This world is what 
is uncovered by the structuralist method. The reader then is confronted by the 
world of a text, and a distanciation between its truth and the horizon of the reader 
results. This is overcome in interpretation. For Ricœur truth and method, therefore, 
are really two stages in the interpretation of a text, corresponding to two related 
types of distanciation. 
THE PHENOMENON of reading a text is something both very familiar and very opaque to us. It is familiar in so far as, since we are for the most part a literate 
society, texts form an integral part of our daily life. Bookstores and newspapers are 
fixtures in our daily life. On the other hand, the experience of reading a text is very 
opaque to the average reader. When asked to describe what it is he is doing in the act 
of reading a novel, newspaper or a philosophical text, he is hard pressed to articulate 
this experience. What we, as readers of texts, take for granted turns out to be not so 
clear after all. It soon becomes obvious that the reading of a text cannot be 
understood on the model of a dialogue between two interlocutors. The fixation of 
discourse, i.e., the creation of a text, has revolutionary consequences for hermeneu-
tical theory. 
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Paul Ricceur has set himself the task of investigating what happens when 
discourse is fixed in writing, and relatedly what it means to read a text. This task has 
occupied him for several years. As we shall discover, the concept of distanciation, a 
concept for which he is partially indebted to Hans-Georg Gadamer, forms an 
essential part of his hermeneutical theory. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to 
examine Ricœur's analysis of the experience of the reading of a text in the light of his 
re-working of Gadamer's concept of distanciation. 
As a preliminary to this study, we should mention that Ricœur's interest in the 
philosophy of language, a component part of which is the study of written discourse, 
evolved over a period of years. It was partially the rise of structuralism, not only as a 
linguistic method but as a philosophy, that prompted Ricceur to change his focus 
from the problem of the structure of the will to the problem of language as such. ' He 
explains in his article, "From Existentialism to the Philosophy of Language", that 
structuralism approaches language as a system that is deeper than the individual's 
own self-consciousness; language is a system before it is an event, i.e., before it is 
used by individuals, and as such functions as a kind of structural unconsciousness. 
Structuralism, therefore, posed a direct challenge to Ricœur's own phenomeno-
logical presuppositions. He writes, "... The primacy of subjectivity which was so 
strongly emphasized by existentialism is overthrown by this displacement of analysis 
from the level of the subject's intentions to the level of linguistic and semiotic 
structures." 2 It had consequences for hermeneutics as well. A written text, examined 
from a structuralist viewpoint, is stripped of its reference. This is because structuralism 
views language as a closed system of signs, which refer to one another within the 
system but never to anything outside of the system. A text's connections both with its 
author and its subsequent readers is severed. 
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Ricœur's approach to the field of 
hermeneutics is coloured strongly by his struggle to come to grips v/ith the 
philosophy of structuralism. It was the challenge put forth by the structuralist 
approach to the reading of a text that pushed him into the field in the first place. For 
one thing, he changed his definition of hermeneutics from the interpretation of 
symbolic language to that of the "specific problems raised by the translation of the 
objective meaning of written language into the personal act of speaking which a 
moment ago I called appropriation." 3 The focus, for him, is now on the written text, 
the object of investigation for structural analysis. We shall discover also that his 
re-working of Gadamer's concept of distanciation occurs in the light of insights that 
Ricceur has gained from structuralism. 
* 
* * 
1. Paul RICCEUR, "From Existentialism to the Philosophy of Language", Philosophy Today 17 (1973), 
pp. 88-111. 
2. Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
3. Ibid., p. 93. 
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Ricceur, as we said, remains committed throughout his investigation into the 
philosophy of language to Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein as a thrown-
projection. Thus we also find that he is very appreciative of Hans-Georg Gadamer's 
work in the area of hermeneutics, who likewise, takes his point of departure from 
Heidegger's phenomenology.4 Nevertheless, despite his fundamental agreement with 
Gadamer's work, he does take exception to some aspects of Gadamer's major work, 
Truth and Method; this is primarily due to his journey through structuralism. Of 
particular significance, as we said, is Ricœur's re-working of Gadamer's concept of 
distanciation (Verfremdung) and its relation to textual interpretation. 
The temporal distance that exists in relation to the interpretation and the to be 
interpreted past text is a prominant theme in Gadamer's writings. A text that comes 
to the reader from out of the past exists in a dialectical relationship of distanciation 
{Verfremdung) and participation (Zugehorigkeit) with him. In so far as he participates 
in the tradition to which the text also belongs, the Sache of the text is familiar. But in 
so far as he is separated in time from the text, the reader experiences the text as alien. 
Interpretation (Auslegung) occupies the position between the familiar and the alien, 
seeking to overcome the alienation by means of what Gadamer calls the fusion of the 
horizon of the text with that of the interpreter (Horizontverschmelzung). In the fusion 
of horizons the distance is overcome, leaving only a relation of participation between 
the reader and the text. He, likewise, stresses that, far from being an obstacle, 
distance in time is actually a productive possibility of understanding. This is because 
a condition for the re-actualization of a text is the existence of a life-relation to the 
Sache of a text on the part of the interpreter. Time is the ground of this process, 
because in it is the continuity of tradition and custom that allows for such a prior 
relatedness.5 
Textual interpretation is an instance of the dialectical interplay between 
participation and distanciation. In a text we have the remarkable situation of the 
simultaneous existence of past tradition with the present.6 Written tradition in the 
form of a text stands alongside the interpreter in its pure ideality of meaning, and 
calls for a mediation of this meaning. It has as a sort of atemporal existence, in that 
its meaning is not that of its author's intended sense nor can it be identified with the 
meaning given to it by its original audience. A text has an ideality of meaning, which 
endures through time, but which is understood differently in its every temporalization. 
Thus Gadamer writes, "The understanding of something written is not a reproduction 
of something that is past, but the sharing of a present meaning." 7 In the event of 
interpretation, the text's horizon, its ideality of meaning, fuses with that of the 
interpreter. The re-temporalization of the meaning of a text, therefore, is the outcome 
of this fusion of horizons. 
4. RICŒUR, "The Task of Hermeneutics", Philosophy Today 17 (1973), pp. 112-128. 
5. Hans-Georg GADAMER, Truth and Method, trans., Sheed and Ward, Ltd. (New York : The Continuum 
Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 263ff. 
6. Ibid., p. 351. 
7. Ibid., p. 354. 
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Gadamer prefers to understand the interpretation of a text in terms of the model 
of the conversation. In essence, a conversation is the attempt of two speakers to agree 
upon the object under consideration by means of a common language.8 Conversation 
requires that the participants be open to the viewpoint of the other and be willing to 
follow the conversational dialectic wherever it leads. To interpret a text, therefore, is 
to enter into conversation with it. The text is an imaginary partner with a certain 
viewpoint (an ideality of meaning) ; to engage it in conversation is to expose one's 
own fore-understanding to the horizon of the text and then be open to be led by the 
ensuing to and fro of such dialectical encounter. In another place, he compares 
tradition with a "Thou", with which we enter into conversation.9 Language, as in any 
dialogue, is the universal medium for any conversation, including that of the 
interpreter with a text. To understand a text is, for Gadamer, to agree with the text 
upon a common object, the same goal that any conversation has ; this is really 
another way of describing the fusion of horizons, in which the tradition of the text 
has disclosed to the interpreter its possibility for being. 
Now, given the priority of the model of conversation in Gadamer's hermeneutic, 
it follows that written discourse has a certain inferiority in contrast to spoken 
discourse. He writes : 
Writing has the methodological advantage that it presents the hermeneutical 
problem in all its purity, detached from everything psychological. What is, 
however, in our eyes and for our purpose a methodological advantage is at the 
same time the expression of a specific weakness that is characteristic of writing 
even more than language. The task of understanding is seen with particular 
clarity when we recognize this weakness of all writing. We need only to think 
again of what Plato said, namely that no one could come to the aid of the written 
word if it falls victim to misunderstanding, intentional or unintentional.10 
All writing, in Gadamer's view is alienated speech. It is speech that has been fixed in 
written signs, and needs to be transformed back into meaningful speech. A text, 
therefore, makes a poorer conversation partner than another human being. Since it 
cannot respond directly to questions put to it by an interpreter, the reader must 
assume the task of making it participate in the dialogue. 
The hermeneutical task, according to Gadamer, is to overcome the self-
alienation of writing and to transform the marks on a page that make up a text back 
into speech. This is done by interpretative understanding, which engages the text as a 
partner in conversation. Thus we could say that the text ts past tradition that has the 
potential to be meaningful in the present. The interpreter is both related to its 
subject-matter and alienated from it at the same time. That is, he exists in a relation 
of participation and distanciation. By virtue of the text's pastness it is alien, but by 
virtue of the interpreter's horizonal continuity with the past tradition in it, the text is 
familiar. This distance, therefore, is what is to be overcome in interpretation. 
8. Ibid., p. 347. 
9. Ibid., p. 321. 
10. Ibid., p. 354. 
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Gadamer writes, "Thus written texts present the real hermeneutical task. Writing 
involves self-alienation. Its overcoming, the reading of a text, is thus the highest task 
of understanding."11 When the distance is thus overcome, there remains only a 
relationship of participation, i.e., of the appropriation of past tradition into the 
present. 
* * 
Ricoeur considers Gadamer's introduction of the dialectical pair of concepts, 
distanciation and participation, to be very valuable in clarifying the experience of 
reading a text.12 To be an historical being is both to belong to the past as well as to be 
distanced from it ; neither pole can be eliminated. Nevertheless, he believes that 
Gadamer's philosophy has an intolerable antinomy within it, which is the inevitable 
outcome of Gadamer's work, Truth and Method. It is at this point that Ricoeur seeks 
to resolve this antinomy by resorting to the insights he has gained from his study of 
structuralism. What is the antinomy that Ricoeur finds in Gadamer's work? 
Ricoeur holds that the opposition in Gadamer's philosophy of distanciation and 
participation invariably leads to an untenable alternative : 
... On the one hand, alienating distanciation is the attitude that makes the 
objectification that reigns in the human sciences possible ; on the other hand, 
this distanciation that is the very condition which accounts for the scientific 
status of the sciences is at the same time a break that destroys the fundamental 
and primordial relation by which we belong to and participate in the historical 
reality which we claim to construct as an object. Thus we reached the alternative 
suggested by the title of Gadamer's work, Truth and Method: either we have the 
methodological attitude and lose the ontological density of the reality under 
study or we have the attitude of truth and must give up the objectivity of the 
human sciences.13 
In Gadamer's work the distanciation between a reader and a text exists only in order 
to be overcome by interpretation. This overcoming of distance is possible in the first 
place because the reader has a prior relatedness (Zugehorigkeit) to the tradition of the 
text. The methodological or objectifying attitude towards the .text, which seeks to 
maintain the distance between the reader and the text as the condition for its 
possibility, is, in Gadamer's view, a distortion of what actually happens in authentic 
textual interpretation. Rather, the reading of a text is the attempt to bridge the 
historical distance by means of interpretation. Thus, it would seem that, as Ricoeur 
rightly observes, Gadamer seems to be choosing truth over method. 
But do we need to choose between these two alternatives ? Is it not possible that 
distanciation and participation are not mutually exclusive options? Ricoeur suggests 
11. Ibid., p. 352. 
12. RICŒUR, "The Task of Hermeneutics", pp. 125-128. 
13. RICŒUR, "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation", Philosophy Today 17 (1973), pp. 129-141. 
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that the methodological approach to a text, the possibility of which is due to 
distanciation, is really an essential part of the interpreter's participation in the truth 
of the text. He arrives at this conclusion with the help of structural analysis. 
Ricœur's inquiry into the nature of a text begins with Ferdinand de Saussure's 
distinction between langage and parole. Language as langage represents the purely 
formal character of language, existing as an abstract system, i.e., abstracted from its 
actual use. This is the object of structural linguistics : it concerns itself with language 
as "un système clos de signes".14 Language, however, for Ricceur, is not simply an 
object for empirical science, i.e., semiotics; it is also semantics {parole), or what he 
calls "une médiation".15 Language, understood in the sense of parole, mediates, first, 
man to the world ; secondly, it is a mediation between man and man ; finally it is a 
mediation of self to self.16 The character of language as mediation is what Ricceur 
refers to as discours (discourse). It, as opposed to semiotics, is not a timeless system of 
signs ; rather, it has a temporal nature, and it is for this reason that he calls an 
instance of discourse "un acte", an event.17 Discourse can only exist in time because 
those who use language are temporal beings. 
The function of discourse, Ricceur continues, is to refer to realities that lie 
outside of the closed system of signs. He writes, "Sur la base de l'acte prédicatif 
l'intenté du discours vise un réel extra-linguistique qui est son réfèrent." 18 Not only 
does discourse aim at saying something about something, but it also refers back to 
the one who is himself signified in the discourse, i.e., the speaker. It also has the 
capacity to refer to different times by means of verb tenses, as well as to different 
places. Each of these types of references aims at realizing one or more of the three 
types of mediation mentioned above. 
But what happens when discourse is written down ? Ricceur answers that a text 
comes into existence: "Appelons texte tout discours fixé par l'écriture."19 The 
creation of a text totally transforms the nature of discourse. In oral discourse, as we 
noted, a speaker refers to extra-linguistic realities within a definite intersubjective 
context. His speech aims to point out certain things to certain people in certain ways 
for certain purposes. All of this changes in the committing of discourse to writing. 
In the fixation of discourse in writing, there results a pulling apart of the 
author's intended meaning from the text's own meaning. By the very fact that it is 
preserved in writing, written discourse is removed from its temporal specificity. As 
Ricceur puts it : 
With written discourse, however, the author's intention and the meaning of the 
text cease to coincide. This dissociation of the verbal meaning of the text and the 
14. RICŒUR, "Philosophie et langage", Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger 168 (1978), 
p. 451. 
15. Ibid, p. 454. 
16. Ibid., p. 454. 
17. Ibid, p. 455. 
18. Ibid, p. 456. 
19. RICŒUR, "Qu'est-ce qu'un texte ? Expliquer et comprendre", in Hermeneutik undDialektik, vol. 2, éd., 
Rudiger Bubner et al. (Tubingen : J. C. B. Mohn, 1970), p. 181. 
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mental intention of the author gives to the concept of inscription its decisive 
significance, beyond the mere fixation of previous oral discourse. Inscription 
becomes synonymous with the semantic autonomy of the text, which results 
from the disconnection of the mental intention of the author from the verbal 
meaning of the text, of what the author meant and what the text means. The 
text's career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author. What the text means 
now matters more than what the author meant when he wrote it.20 
The separation of the author's meaning and that of the text leads to the text 
becoming productive of new meanings. In this Ricceur is in full agreement with 
Gadamer's hermeneutical theory. 
But from here Ricceur draws the further conclusion that in no way can one draw 
parallels between the writer and speaker, on the one hand, and the reader and 
listener, on the other. The fact that, in the writing-reading relationship, the two 
cannot be considered as interlocutors destroys the possibility of such a parallelism. 
Ricceur writes, "Il ne suffit pas de dire que la lecture est un dialogue avec l'auteur à 
travers son œuvre ; il faut dire que le rapport du lecteur au livre est d'une tout autre 
nature ; le dialogue est un échange de questions et de réponses ; il n'y a pas d'échange 
de cette sorte entre l'écrivain et le lecteur."21 Between the author and the reader the 
text thus produces what Ricceur calls "une double occultation",22 thereby eliminating 
any possibility of the establishment of a dialogue between the two. Gadamer, as we 
saw, preferred to understand the reading of the text by means of the model of 
conversation. Now, he did not imagine that in the reading of a text the reader 
was carrying on a conversation with its author ; rather, the reader of a text was 
conversing with the text, itself. Nevertheless, he did see interpretation as a conversa-
tion. Ricceur, it would appear, is rejecting Gadamer's model. (One could even argue 
that Gadamer is inconsistent in holding that interpretation is a conversation with the 
text ; unfortunately, the scope of this paper does not allow for an elaboration of this.) 
We shall come back to this point a little later in the paper. 
What happens, therefore, in the fixation of discourse is the distancing of the text 
from the author's original context. This is Ricceur's first understanding of the 
concept of distanciation.23 Inasmuch, however, as a text no longer coincides with its 
author's particular purposes in writing it, it reveals itself to have a "surplus of 
meaning"24. Distanciation, conceived as the separation of the author's intention and 
the meaning of the text, is the negative condition for the possibility of new and deeper 
meanings to emerge. He writes, "Elle [sa thèse] pose que la suspension de la 
référence, au sens défini par les normes du discours descriptif, est la condition 
négative pour que soit dégagé un mode plus fondamental de référence."25 In oral 
20. RICCEUR, Interpretation Theory: Discours and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, Texas: The 
Texas Christian University Press, 1976), pp. 29ff. 
21. RICŒUR, "Qu'est-ce qu'un texte?", p. 182. 
22. Ibid., p. 182. 
23. RICŒUR, "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation", p. 134. 
24. RICŒUR, Interpretation Theory, cf. supra, note 20. 
25. RICŒUR, "Philosophie et langage", p. 460. 
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discourse, the reference is what Ricceur calls ostensive26, i.e., it refers to entities 
within the shared environment of speaker and listener. A text, or written discourse, 
leaves behind this ostensive reference, and, as a result, develops a deeper reference, 
which Ricceur calls "le monde du texte" 27. The world-reference does not refer to 
particular entities in a particular world ; instead, it offers the reader new possibilities 
of being-in-the-world. It is, in fact, in terms of the world of the text that Ricceur 
defines the task of hermeneutics : "Si l'on définit l'herméneutique comme la science 
des règles d'interprétation des textes, c'est bien en une interprétation que consiste l'art 
de dégager ce que j'appellerai désormais le monde du texte"28. 
Ricceur seems also to have provided a second meaning for the concept of 
distanciation, one that resembles that of Gadamer. In Gadamer's thought, we noted 
that the interpreter stands before the text as someone whose task it is to understand 
what the text is about, i.e., its Sache. We must take the word "understand" in this 
context in the Heideggerian sense of the projection of Dasein's ownmost possibilities 
(Verstehen). All understanding is self-understanding. The assimilation of past 
tradition, to which we have a relation of participation and distanciation, is the 
projecting of the interpreter's potentiality of being. This is what the fusion of 
horizons means. Now Ricceur holds essentially the same position, although he does 
not often use the word distanciation to describe the interpreter's separation from the 
world of the text prior to his assimilation of it. 
We find this second meaning of distanciation articulated in Ricceur's writings in 
close conjunction with his concept of appropriation. The two are antonyms for him. 
Often, in fact, Ricceur will use the word estrangement {l'éloignement) as a synonym 
for distanciation. He says, for example : 
"Par le terme d'appropriation, on soulignera encore deux traits ; une des finalités 
de toute herméneutique est de lutter contre la distance culturelle ; cette lutte 
peut elle-même se comprendre en termes purement temporels, comme une lutte 
contre l'éloignement séculaire, ou en termes plus véritablement herméneutiques, 
comme une lutte contre l'éloignement à l'égard du sens lui-même, c'est-à-dire à 
l'égard du système de valeurs sur lequel le texte s'établit ; en ce sens, l'interpré-
tation 'rapproche', 'égalise', rend 'contemporain et semblable', ce qui est 
véritablement rendre propre ce qui d'abord était étranger P 
It is obvious that what Ricceur means by the second meaning of the struggle against 
distance — the estrangement from meaning itself— is what Gadamer means by his 
concept of distanciation. Likewise, the making one's own what is alien, i.e., 
appropriation, in Ricceur's works, corresponds to Gadamer's concept of the fusion 
of the horizon of the text with that of the interpreter, and his concept of Aneignung. 
In another work, Ricceur elaborates further this second meaning of distanciation and 
26. RICŒUR. "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text", Social Research 38 
(1971), pp. 528-562. 
27. RICŒUR, "Philosophie et langage", p. 460. 
28. Ibid., p. 460. 
29. RICŒUR, "Qu'est-ce qu'un texte?", p. 195. 
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its complement, appropriation. He writes that temporal distance is more than simply 
the temporal and spatial distance between a text and its reader. Rather, "it is a 
dialectical trait, the principle of a struggle between the otherness that transforms all 
spatial and temporal distance into cultural estrangement and the owness by which 
all understanding aims at the extension of self-understanding."30 Appropriation is 
the recovery of this cultural estrangement, the process by which the meaning of a text 
is brought back from its alienation. Thus we can see that Ricœur's second 
understanding of the concept of distanciation is in substantial agreement with 
Gadamer's own concept of the same. 
This leads us to the question of whether Ricœur's two definitions of distanciation 
are related. It seems that they are. The first distanciation emerges as a result of the 
fixation of discourse in writing. In such an event, the meaning of the text becomes 
separated from the author's intended sense. This distanciation, however, results in 
the emergence of a deeper reference, namely, the world of the text. This world does 
not point to entities within the world, but discloses to the reader possibilities of 
being-in-the-world. Now, because there exists this first type of distanciation, it 
becomes possible for the second type to arise. Texts exist as bearers of possibilities of 
being-in-the-world. We, as interpreters, are distanced from these texts, not only in the 
temporal and spatial sense, but distanced with respect to their meanings. It is only in 
appropriation that this distance is overcome. Ricœur's concept of distanciation, 
therefore, is two-sided. This is how it appears that he would have us understand it. 
* * 
We are now finally in a position to understand how Ricœur's re-working of 
Gadamer's concept of distanciation functions as a necessary corrective to the latter's 
untenable alternative between truth and method. Structuralism deals with the text as 
a system of signs. It considers it as a worldless and authorless object ("texte sans 
monde et auteur"), distanced from its author's original intentions and its original 
audience. Structural analysis restricts itself to the closed system of signs that make up 
the language of a text. Ricœur gives the essence of structuralism in four postulates.31 
First, structuralism does not concern itself with the relation of language to reality : 
"... le langage... doit devenir un objet homogène... isolé: la langue"32. Secondly, 
structuralism gives priority to the synchronistic approach to language over that of the 
diachronistic. It is essential that a given language be treated as a self-contained 
system. "Troisième postulat : dans un état de système il n'y a pas de termes absolus, 
mais uniquement des relations de dépendance mutuelle..."33 That is to say, that every 
sign exists in relation to other signs. Finally, the system of signs must be taken to be 
closed, which in turn implies that the system is finite and limited. 
30. RICŒUR, Interpretation Theory, cf. supra, note 20. 
31. RICŒUR, "Philosophie et langage", p. 450. 
32. Ibid., p. 450. 
33. Ibid., p. 451. 
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Now, according to Ricceur, since this first distanciation, which results in the text 
escaping the horizons of its author, its autonomy, leaves the text worldless and 
authorless, it is able thereby to become an object of structural analysis. It becomes, in 
other words, the object of a methodological, i.e., semiological investigation. He 
writes : 
Ce projet est non seulement possible mais légitime ; en effet, la constitution du 
texte comme texte et du réseau de textes comme littérature autorise l'interception 
de cette double transcendance du discours, vers un monde et vers un autrui. À 
partir de là est possible un comportement explicatif à l'égard du texte.34 
The explanatory attitude to the text seeks to explain the text in terms of the internal 
relations of its signs, i.e., the structure of the text. Such a reading of a text must 
adhere to strict methodological rules. It would seem legitimate to say that what 
Gadamer describes as the text's ideality of meaning is what Ricceur means by its 
depth structure, or its world. The difference between Ricceur and Gadamer, however, 
is that for the former, the structure of a text can become the object of empirical 
science, i.e., semiotics, whereas this dimension is absent in the latter's work. 
A structural analysis of a text must be conjoined with a second type of reading of 
the text : interpretation. Ricceur expresses it as follows, "... Nous pouvons aussi lever 
ce suspens et achever le texte en parole actuelle."35 The real purpose of reading is 
self-understanding, the re-actualization and appropriation of the world of the text, 
understood as possibilities of being. We now come across the second type of 
distanciation, the estrangement from meaning. The text, as an object of structural 
analysis, gives rise to what Ricceur calls a depth semantics (la sémantique profonde), 
which does not coincide with its author's intented sense. Rather, this depth semantic 
is the structure of the text itself; it is the world, or non-ostensive reference, of the text. 
Thus, the emergence of the world of the text as a result of adopting the explanatory 
attitude towards a text, creates the second type of distanciation. The reader, having 
explained a text, now finds himself distanced from the world of the text, which 
emerged as a result of his structural analysis of it. His task now is to interpret the text, 
to re-actualize the intention of the text, thus overcoming this estrangement. As 
Ricceur puts it, "Therefore what we want to understand is not something hidden 
behind the text, but something disclosed in front of it." 36 That is to say, the reader 
seeks to uncover new possibilities for his being-in-the-world, opened up by the text. 
What was once alien becomes, by means of interpretation, his own. 
To put it differently, the removal of discourse from its temporal specificity by 
means of its fixation in writing gives the text a semantic autonomy. This, in turn, 
results in what Ricceur calls the objectification of discourse. He says, "L'autonomie 
sémantique du discours constitue, comme l'avait d'ailleurs vu Dilthey, une des 
34. RICŒUR, "Qu'est-ce qu'un texte?", p. 189. 
35. Ibid., p. 194. 
36. RICŒUR, "The Model of the Text : Meaningful Action Considered as a Text", cf. supra, note 26. 
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conditions plus fondamentales d'objectification du discours."37 It is this objectifica-
tion of discourse that is the condition for the possibility for, first, the existence of the 
world of the text (which is the defining characteristic of literature), and secondly, for 
the possibility of as well as the necessity for explanation. "Cette extériorisation dans 
des marques matérielles et cette inscription dans des codes de discours, rendent non 
seulement possible mais nécessaire la médiation de la compréhension par l'explication, 
dont l'analyse structurale du récit constitue la plus remarquable exécution." 38 The 
objectification of discourse in the form of a text requires that the interpreter adopt a 
methodological attitude towards the text, the application of which allows the non-
ostensive reference of the text, its world, to emerge, which subsequently is to be 
appropriated. After method comes truth. Although method is not an end in itself, its 
use is a necessary condition for interpreting a text. 
Explanation (structural analysis) and interpretation are not, therefore, two 
mutually exclusive approaches to the interpretation of a text. Rather, they actually 
are two points along what Ricceur calls the hermeneutical arc : 
Si au contraire on tient l'analyse structurale pour une étape — et une étape 
nécessaire — entre une interprétation naïve et une interprétation critique, entre 
une interprétation en surface et une interprétation en profondeur, alors il 
apparaît possible de replacer l'explication et l'interprétation sur un unique arc 
herméneutique et d'intégrer les attitudes opposées de l'explication et de la 
compréhension dans une conception globale de la lecture comme reprise du 
sens.39 
The function of explanation is to move from a naive and surface reading of the text to 
a depth meaning. We took this to mean above that structural analysis brings out the 
internal structure of the text, its non-ostensive reference, its world. Interpretation, on 
the other hand, is the appropriation of this non-ostensive reference. In appropriation 
distance is overcome and participation (Zugehorigkeit), to use Gadamer's term, alone 
remains. 
From here we must conclude that Gadamer's distinction between truth and 
method need not be seen as an antinomy between two conflicting approaches to 
textual interpretation. There is no necessary conflict between explanation and 
interpretation. We saw that, by virtue of being written down, the text's meaning was 
distanced from its author's intended sense. This distance is the negative condition for 
the application to the text of the structural analytical method, which seeks to bring 
out the non-ostensive reference of the text, or its world. This is the methodological 
stage in the reading of a text, according to Ricceur. This first distanciation, in turn, 
gives rise to a second, namely, the distanciation between the reader and what the text 
is about, i.e., the truth of the text. It is in this second sense that Gadamer understands 
distanciation. Thus we find that Ricceur, by introducing structural analysis into 
37. RICŒUR, "Expliquer et comprendre", Revue philosophique de Louvain, Séries 4, 75 (1977), pp. 126-147. 
38. Ibid., p. 131. 
39. RICŒUR, "Qu'est-ce qu'un texte?", p. 197. 
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hermeneutical philosophy, has been able to re-work Gadamer's concept of distancia-
tion in order to avoid the antinomy between the methodological attitude towards a 
text and the existential or hermeneutical attitude. 
Likewise, Gadamer's preference to view a text as self-alienated discourse and 
interpretation as conversation needs also to be revised if we follow Ricœur's line of 
thinking. Written discourse is not in any way an inferior form of oral discourse. In 
the fixation of discourse in writing, we have, according to Ricceur, the introduction 
of something entirely new into human existence : the text. The text is not oral 
discourse because in the process of fixation it undergoes a distanciation from its 
author's immediate environment. It becomes an autonomous entity. This first 
distanciation is the negative condition for the emergence of the world of the text, 
which in turns guarantees that the career of the text will escape the finite horizons of 
its author. Thus to understand the reading of a text, as Gadamer does, on the model 
of conversation and written discourse as an inferior form of the spoken kind is quite 
inappropriate and has the potential for misunderstanding. As we intimated above, 
perhaps Gadamer's own view of the meaning of a text as going beyond its author's 
intended sense should in fact lead him to abandon his conversation model of textual 
interpretation. 
In conclusion, we have seen how Ricœur re-works Gadamer's concept of 
distanciation in his analysis of the experience of reading text. In particular he 
differentiates two related notions of distanciation — that between the author and his 
text and that between the reader and the world of the text — which allows him to 
introduce into interpretation theory two stages in the reading of a text. These two 
stages are, as we saw, explanation and interpretation. The former can be called 
methodological stage, while the latter stage is that of appropriation, or the 
assimilation of the truth of the text. The recognition of these two levels of 
distanciation allows for the introduction of structural analysis into interpretation as 
the preliminary methodological stage to the appropriation of the truth of a text. 
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